Gen. Stanley McChrystal - Tag Search

No blogging yesterday while I worked on a couple of reported projects -- so I'll spare you any day-after thoughts on President Obama's choice to replace Gen. Stanley McChrystal with Gen. David Petraeus. You've read enough of those already, I'm sure.

Instead, let's pivot back to what's actually happening in Afghanistan. As I said in my Al-Jazeera piece about McChrystal's departure, the change of command isn't likely to mean a major change in strategy: McChrystal was hardly the only counterinsurgency believer in the military, and many elements of his "new strategy" actually began under his predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan.

(Updated w/article excerpt) I just finished reading the new Rolling Stone profile on Gen. Stanley McChrystal that's generating so much controversy. (It's not yet available online; if you're interested in a copy, e-mail me.)

Here's my quick reaction: Very little about the article is surprising! I think we all knew that McChrystal has a tense relationship with Karl Eikenberry; that he didn't think much of vice president Joe Biden's light-footprint counterterrorism strategy; that the military command feels hamstrung by the summer 2011 withdrawal timeline; and so on.

I'm a little late in responding to Michael Cohen's cri de coeur about liberal silence on Obama's increasingly-on-the-wrong-track Afghan strategy. I agree with his basic premise -- the left, particularly the left-wing media, has been quiet about Afghanistan -- though I think he ignores some contradictory evidence.

Spencer Ackerman outlines most of the reasons for the left's quietude. I would add one other point: It's difficult to outline a good alternative, and it requires a certain degree of local knowledge to do so.

File this one under "highly unlikely": Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and one of the most powerful men in southern Afghanistan, has reportedly agreed with NATO to "play a less important role" and cede power to other officials.

Apologies for my non-existent blogging over the last few days! I've been swamped with work -- blogging/interviewing people at the Al-Jazeera forum here in Doha, and brainstorming on a new project we're launching in the next few weeks (details to come...).

Anyway. One of the people I interviewed was Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan (his new autobiography is a worthwhile read).

We were talking about the Kandahar offensive (sorry, process) after the interview, which elicited a laugh from Zaeef. He held out his right hand to signify the US troops pushing into Kandahar, then drew a semicircle in the air to symbolize the Taliban. "They will not find us in Kandahar. We will go around them and attack them from behind."

Evan did a comprehensive roundup of the news from Afghan president Hamid Karzai's visit to Washington this week. Just one thing to add from me.

I have a post over on Al-Jazeera's Web site looking at Afghanistan's ongoing governance problems, none of which received much (public) attention during Karzai's visit. One thing I couldn't really address, for space reasons, is how these problems influence perceptions of the upcoming Kandahar campaign/operation/process/whatever we're calling it these days.

U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates deserves some credit for his fairly reasoned and non-triumphal public statements during this week's trip to Afghanistan. He warned against over-optimism in Afghanistan, stressing that there are "dark days" ahead and that the quick "clear" phase in Marja doesn't suddenly mean the war is won (or even that Operation Moshtarak is won).

In Now Zad yesterday, he commended soldiers and Marines for clearing the area of Taliban, but then said "you own it" -- and warned of a complicated path ahead.

Pakistani officials say they've arrested another senior Taliban leader in Karachi. Agha Jan Motasim, an aide to Mullah Omar, has been missing for two weeks; military sources said today that he was detained.

The Pakistani government won't give the U.S. access to most of its detainees, so nobody's sure exactly how many members of the Quetta Shura they've arrested -- maybe half, maybe more, maybe less -- but it is clearly a significant number. So I tend to think we've settled the question of whether these arrests are a deliberate effort or just dumb luck.

I'm trying to figure out the logic behind NATO's latest rhetorical pivot.

I expected the Marja triumphalism -- the arrival of NATO's hand-picked governor, Haji Zahir, and the well-publicized flag-raising ceremony. Commanders said today that they've finished the "clear" phase of "clear-hold-build-transfer"; a press release from ISAF said NATO and Afghan soldiers have "cleared the last major pocket of resistance," though -- as with past Helmand surges -- the definition of "cleared" isn't necessarily what you think.

Dexter Filkins, who Josh Foust recently dubbed "ISAF's official spokesman at the New York Times," has a remarkably upbeat analysis of the war in Afghanistan in today's week-in-review section. Filkins mentions several times that he, personally, feels optimistic about the direction of the war -- and builds to this conclusion (emphasis mine).

At week's end, by all accounts, the Marja operation was going well. In Pakistan, Mr. Baradar was said to be talking. After four long years, the initiative, at least for now, had returned to the Americans.

The U.S. is fighting a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Much ink has been spilled over the last few months about how the war is now population-centric, not enemy-centric; how "hearts and minds" matter more than body counts.

If you go to Google News and search for "Marja," you'll find (literally) about 4,000 stories, most of which are rewrites of the same set of ISAF talking points: 20,000 NATO and Afghan troops are gearing up to attack the Taliban; Marja is the Taliban's last refuge in southern Afghanistan; the battle will be the most important military operation in eight years; etc., etc.

Very few of these bother to point out the inherent contradictions in Operation Moshtarak -- like the conflict between this enemy-centric offensive and NATO's stated population-centric strategy.

Things are already getting better in Afghanistan, according to Gen. Stanley McChrystal:

The commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, noted that last summer he believed security in Afghanistan was at risk of significant decline, but that he felt differently now. "I am not prepared to say that we have turned the corner," he cautioned. "So I'm saying that the situation is serious but I think we have made significant progress in setting the conditions in 2009, and beginning some progress, and that we'll make real progress in 2010."

Listen, I understand that there's a certain damned if you do, damned if you don't quality to McChrystal's public pronouncements about the war. But why not say to the press, listen, guys, the boss just announced his new strategy in December, Holbrooke just unveiled his civilian plan a few weeks ago, most of the surge troops haven't arrived yet, and it's too early to make any pronouncements -- but we're confident this strategy will work.

Instead McChrystal says things have improved in the last two months -- not really a defensible proposition, and also not one that helps a counterinsurgency strategy in the long term, because it cements in the public mind the illusion of quick and easy progress.

An anonymous British diplomat -- those were the ground rules, sorry (I hate background briefings) -- says Thursday's London conference on Afghanistan will focus on three broad areas of the civilian strategy.

• "Reassurance to the Afghan people," which includes governance and economic development -- basically, quality-of-life issues;

• "Some form of outreach to the insurgency," which will include both reintegration and reconciliation;

• "A regional aspect to the future of Afghanistan," or an effort to align Afghanistan's interests with those of its neighbors, particularly Pakistan and Iran.

The anonymous diplomat stressed that the conference will not cover military strategy; he said (repeatedly) that NATO civilian leaders are confident in Gen. Stanley McChrystal's approach.

Spencer Ackerman reports this morning that, while the number of U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan has increased, the number of civilian casualties caused by U.S. troops has dropped.

Those numbers are certainly encouraging for the U.S. and NATO: Counterinsurgency theory stresses that you shouldn't kill the population you're trying to protect. But I'm not sure (contra Ackerman) that there's anything surprising about this trend.

Update: Exum responded to me by e-mail, but I don't have permission to use it yet. However, I think it is safe (and important) to tell readers this: Exum did not advise the Obama campaign on Afghan issues. That renders moot most of my concerns regarding conflicts of interest and re-judging Exum's writings in context. More to come later.

A sharp critique of U.S. military intelligence efforts in Afghanistan, written by Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the top intelligence officer in the country, is making waves in Washington, D.C.; even, it seems, inside Flynn's own place of business -- the Pentagon -- which on Tuesday seemed a little taken aback by his decision to publish the article -- which doubles as an official directive -- through the Center for a New American Security.

"I think it struck everybody as a little bit curious, yes ... My sense is that this was an anomaly and that we probably won't see that (in the future)," Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told Reuters. "It was an unusual and irregular way to publish a document of this nature."

I think Flynn made a bold, honest and correct decision -- he lived up to the expectation of information sharing that he has now demanded from his own officers. (Cynically speaking, he's also made himself look like a great think tank candidate, should he find that the wind leaves his sails after uncorking a grenade like this.)

I took yesterday off from blogging to catch up on some "real" work, so I'm just now reading up on the latest developments from Afghanistan.

First, there was a bit of good news yesterday: Kai Eide, the head of the United Nations mission in Kabul, announced that he will step down when his term ends in March. Eide insists this isn't a resignation -- "I'm just not renewing my contract," he said yesterday. But it's clear that he sees the writing on the wall, after months of controversy over his handling of the Afghan election.

I started writing a post this morning about the incoherent military operations in Afghanistan that have followed Obama's surge announcement. I left it unfinished because I had to run to Capitol Hill for an interview about Lebanon; I came back to this tweet from Matt Yglesias, which sums up my thoughts quite well:

Too many words being written generals testifying on the Hill, not enough about actual events in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Karl Eikenberry really did not make news in their first round of congressional testimony yesterday -- despite the thousands of stories and blog posts written about the hearings.

I'm alternately amused and annoyed when I read headlines like McChrystal backs Afghan plan to skeptical Congress. McChrystal is an officer in the United States military; the president of the United States is his boss. He has a simple choice: He can support the president's plan, or he can resign. If he does the former, it's not newsworthy.

Same goes for headlines about how McChrystal thinks the war plan will succeed. What did everyone expect? That he would take the witness stand yesterday and say, "sorry, guys, we're fucked"?

Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Karl Eikenberry start their first of three days of testimony later this morning. Today they'll appear before the House Armed Services committee at 9:30 a.m. and the Senate Armed Services committee at 1:30 p.m.; tomorrow, the Senate Foreign Affairs committee, at 10:00 a.m.; and Thursday, the House Foreign Affairs committee, at 9:30 a.m.

I can't attend any of the hearings, regrettably, though I will try and watch at least one of them on television.

And perhaps I shouldn't regret having better things to do. I'm sure the hearings will be great political theater, but will they be informative? Wired's Danger Room blog posted a great set of questions -- from Robert Farley, Joshua Foust and others -- that Congress should ask the general and the ambassador. My guess, though, is that less than half of these actually get asked.