Blogging the Goldstone Report

Many writers (and some of our readers!) have by now concluded that Richard Goldstone is a hopelessly biased, pro-Hamas naif. Today's section (p. 371-401) might not convince them otherwise. But those of you with open minds, read on: Goldstone devotes a number of pages to criticizing Hamas.

The report first spends two pages talking about Gilad Shalit. This section is brief because Shalit's case is so clear-cut: He is a uniformed Israeli soldier, captured by an enemy force during an incursion. He's obviously a prisoner of war, and his detention -- incommunicado, without access to the Red Cross -- violates the Geneva Conventions.

Apparently it's installment-blogging day around here: Evan has another episode of his Arab Human Development Report series, and I'm back after a week-long Goldstone hiatus with the next (rather lengthy) section of the report, p. 324-371.

This section considers two broad topics: First, the legality of Israel's military strategy during Operation Cast Lead; and second, the impact of the war, and the ongoing blockade, on the civilian population of Gaza.

The next section of the Goldstone Report (p. 300-324) discusses the detention of hundreds of Gazans during Operation Cast Lead.

A preface: This section is more thinly-sourced than the others I've read. The mission deems credible all of the witnesses it interviewed - but, unlike with other sections, there is no physical evidence to back up their claims.

Anyway, the report notes that hundreds of prisoners were detained by the Israeli government during the war; around 100 of them were eventually taken to prisons in Israel. Some have been released, while others are still locked up. Many were held incommunicado for weeks, denied access to their family members and to the Red Cross.

A Goldstone double feature today - one section now, one section later tonight - since it's a dreary Columbus Day here in Washington.

We pick up on p. 280 with a chapter on Israel's alleged use of Palestinian human shields during Operation Cast Lead. The mission considers stories from four men. The first, Majdi Abd Rabbo, is a 39-year-old father of five, a Fatah member, and an intelligence officer in the Palestinian Authority. He lives east of the Jabaliyah camp, near the Israeli border.

Rabbo told the mission that Israeli forces entered his house around 9:30 a.m. on January 5, 2009. Soldiers told him to strip to his underwear (to make sure he wasn't armed), and repeated the procedure for his sons.

Israel destroyed a lot of infrastructure in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. Today's section of the Goldstone Report (p. 254-280) deals with some of the highest-profile incidents.

I should point out, as a preface, that the Jerusalem Post recently editorialized in favor of Israel's right to attack these targets. Unlike the various attacks on civilians, which Israel routinely denied, there seems to be widespread consensus that Israel did, in fact, damage Gaza's infrastructure.

The report first considers the bombing of the el-Bader flour mill, operated by the Hamada brothers, both of whom carry "Businessman Cards," which allow them to travel into Israel to do business. Less than 100 Gaza residents possess these cards; Israe only grants them after a detailed background check. (In other words, it's unlikely that people who possess these cards are tied to Hamas.)

At the time of Operation Cast lead, the el-Bader mill was the only one of Gaza's three flour mills still operating.

Today's installment (p. 233-253) picks up where yesterday's left off, examining three more allegations of attacks against unarmed civilians.

The first targeted the al-Maqadmah mosque outside of Jabaliyah camp. It was bombed around sunset on January 3, 2009, when between 200 and 300 people were gathered in the mosque for evening at prayers. Witnesses say the mosque was struck by a missile, which blew the heavy wooden doors off their hinges and caused extensive damage to the structure. The attack killed at least 15 people and wounded another 40, many of them seriously.

One of the casualties, according to the Goldstone Report, was a young boy whose leg was blown off. It was later found on the roof of the mosque.

Today's installment of the Goldstone Report (p. 209-233) documents a series of attacks against unarmed civilians carried out from January 4-6, 2009. The legal question here is whether the IDF had any reason to believe the civilians were taking part in hostilities. If not, under international law, they are protected from attacks.

The first attack targeted Iyad al-Samouni's family -- he's related to the al-Samouni family from yesterday's section. His family was detained by Israeli soldiers for one day, January 4, and then began walking towards Gaza City. The U.N. mission isn't sure why they left. They might have been ordered to leave by Israeli soldiers, or they might have left in fear after Wa'el al-Samouni's house was shelled (see yesterday's section).

In any event, shortly after leaving their house, Iyad was shot by Israeli snipers. He was handcuffed at the time; when the Red Crescent was finally able to retrieve his body, three days later, he was still wearing the white plastic cuffs. (His family tried to help him immediately after he was shot, but the snipers fired warning shots to keep them away.)

We're back after a short hiatus with the next section of the Goldstone Report, p. 185-209. It begins with the shelling of al-Fakhura Street in the Jabaliyah camp in northern Gaza. UNRWA was using an elementary school on the street to shelter 1,368 civilians; all of them were registered by name and searched for weapons, according to the report.

The shelling took place on the morning of January 6, 2009. About six hours prior to the attack, according to the report, an Israeli F-16 bombed the house of Abu Askar, a man who lived near the school. Askar received a call seven minutes before his house was bombed; he evacuated his family in time.

Yesterday, the Goldstone Report asked if Hamas violated international law by endangering civilians. Today it asks the same question of the IDF, on p. 151-185.

Goldstone considers two main questions: whether Israel gave civilians ample warning of imminent attacks, and whether certain attacks violated the Geneva Conventions by choosing civilian targets.

On the first question, the report notes that Israel made 165,000 phone calls to warn Gaza residents, and dropped more than 2.5 million leaflets over the Gaza Strip. Israel also applied a technique called "roof knocking," in which jets dropped small explosives on houses to warn the inhabitants of larger bombs to come.

Some of the phone calls were made on short notice, though: One man recounts receiving a warning at 1:45 a.m. and hastily evacuating 40 people; his house was destroyed seven minutes later.

Today's section of the Goldstone Report (p. 134-151) is probably one of the more controversial chapters. It examines whether Palestinian combatants violated international law by endangering civilians: launching attacks from civilian areas, for example, or mingling with the population. (Tomorrow's section asks a similar question about the IDF.)

The chapter begins by noting that many Palestinians interviewed in Gaza "appeared reluctant to speak." The report doesn't say why, though it speculates that the interviewees were afraid of reprisals (p. 134).

The U.N. mission interviews several unnamed members of the "Gaza authorities," all of whom deny any knowledge of the tactics used by groups like the al-Qassam Brigades. The military groups themselves declined to meet with the mission.

If armed groups did break the law and place civilians at risk, they caused two major problems. First, Hamas would violate its own obligations until international law, which requires belligerents to take certain steps to protect civilians. Second, it would give Israel a justification for launching attacks on civilian areas.

After a weekend break we're back to blogging the Goldstone Report. Today we'll cover p. 109-134, which deals with Israeli attacks on Hamas' political infrastructure and the Gaza police.

This section opens by noting that seven political institutions were "completely or partially leveled," including the archives building and the presidential compound. The ministries of justice, culture and interior were also completely or partially destroyed, along with dozens of municipal facilities. (p. 110)

The report focuses on two particular buildings: the Palestinian Legislative Council and the main al-Saraya prison compound in Gaza City.

We'll tackle a short section today, mostly because I had a long day at work and I'm exhausted, but also because tomorrow's section -- which focuses on Israeli attacks on Palestinian police -- is an important one. I'd like to devote a lengthy post to it.

So today we'll look at p. 95-109. This section begins with a history of the Israeli blockade of Gaza, which began in February 2006 after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary election. Israel would periodically cut off the flow of goods into Gaza, depending on the political climate and the level of violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Western countries also imposed a sort of blockade of their own, cutting off aid to Hamas and redirecting it to NGOs and other organizations.

Yesterday's reading covered the 40 years of history between the Six-Day War and Operation Cast Lead. Today's reading (p. 71-95) focuses specifically on the six months of calm -- the tahdiyah -- that preceded Israel's winter war in Gaza.

The tahdiyah was a six-month truce agreed to by both Israel and the Palestinians, though the Goldstone Report notes that both sides had interpretations of the deal that "differed substantially." It was supposed to end terrorist attacks by Palestinian groups against Israel and stop Israeli military offensives in Gaza. It did neither.

Three weeks after it started, both sides were also supposed to meet to discuss a prisoner exchange and the re-opening of the Israel-Gaza border crossings. By the end of the tahdiyah, Israel had taken more Palestinian prisoners, and the border crossings were sealed tight.

Today's installment of the Goldstone Report (p. 39-70, if you're following along at home) is slightly boring compared to yesterday's executive summary. This section provides more detail on the report's methodology and a broad history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It begins with some background on the team members: Richard Goldstone, a former South African judge; Christine Chinkin, a professor at the London School of Economics; Hina Jilani, the advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan; and Col. Desmond Travers, a former officer in Ireland's Defence Forces.

The team points out that it was operating under a very limited timeframe -- about three months. So it cautions that this report is not an exhaustive review of every allegation leveled against Israel and Hamas.

The Goldstone Report begins with a roughly 35-page executive summary, starting with a few pages devoted to the mission of the Mission.

The introduction repeatedly states that the Israeli government did not cooperate with the mission. The investigators weren't allowed to travel to Gaza through Israel; instead, the Egyptian government agreed to allow them through the Rafah crossing. They weren't allowed to travel to the West Bank at all, so they met with a handful of West Bank Palestinians in Amman.

One such Palestinian, Muhammad Srour, was detained by Israeli authorities upon returning from Amman. The summary doesn't say why, just that the mission is "in contact with him."

The report is based on 188 interviews, more than 300 documents, 30 videos and 1,200 photographs.

The "Goldstone Report" contains the conclusions of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict. The mission -- which was headed by former South African judge Richard Goldstone -- concludes that both sides committed war crimes during the winter war in Gaza.