Eide and Baradar: What does the U.N. want, anyway?

I'm not sure that's a fair conclusion, first of all: The U.S. government is not entirely thrilled with Pakistan's newfound enthusiasm for arresting Taliban members. The Obama administration has been careful not to speculate about Pakistan's motives, and usually refuses to term this a "strategic shift." I think it's fair to say there's a good deal of skepticism in Washington.

As for the practical question: What role should Pakistan play? Well, how about going after the Haqqani network? The Haqqanis are the biggest security threat in Afghanistan; they're a far larger problem than the Quetta Shura, and (despite what Gen. Stanley McChrystal might think) they've shown zero interest in reconciliation with Kabul. They also continue to enjoy the ISI's protection.

I understand we're getting into questions of self-interest here. Pakistan's security apparatus views the Haqqanis, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as assets; Baradar (and much of the QST's leadership) doesn't enjoy the same standing.

But that's what motivated Eide's criticism. The U.N. wants Pakistan to play a constructive role in Afghanistan, one that improves the prospects for a durable long-term government in Kabul. Arresting "moderate" Taliban leaders, while protecting the extremists in the Haqqani network, achieves the opposite result.