Peace Processing

Strategic interests and the "special relationship" with Israel

Supporters of a "special relationship" between America and Israel -- Aaron David Miller, for example -- often cite two justifications for these close ties: shared values and strategic interests.

The former claim is hard to assess, because it's so subjective. I have Israeli friends who share my personal values, but I'm an agnostic liberal from New York; I wouldn't claim my values are perfectly representative of "American values." I've met other Israelis, those who seem to prefer an elected theocracy to a liberal democracy, whose values I find repellent -- but perhaps other Americans find more common ground with those Israelis.

How about the other question, then? Does America's "special relationship" with Israel serve its strategic interests? Consider a few areas of foreign policy.

Iraq and Afghanistan

Even if it desperately wanted to, the Israeli government could not contribute troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. Both of these wars are bad for America's public image in the Muslim world -- but they would be far worse if Israel contributed troops. (That doesn't stop senior Taliban leaders from floating conspiracy theories about Israeli involvement in Afghanistan, of course.) So America's close ties to Israel yield no benefits for its two military engagements in the region.

Iran

The U.S. is clearly worried about the prospect of an Iranian nuclear bomb. It poses essentially no threat to the United States: The regime in Tehran, which has demonstrated itself to be chiefly concerned with self-preservation, has neither the desire nor the technology to launch a nuclear strike against the United States. Nor would it hand the weapon to a terrorist group for third-party use; nuclear weapons have signatures, and the bomb could be easily traced back to Tehran.

For the same reasons -- plus a few others -- I don't think the Iranian regime would use a nuclear weapon against Israel.

But an Iranian bomb would destabilize regional geopolitics; it would probably drive a few of Iran's Sunni Arab neighbors to pursue their own weapons; and nuclear proliferation is objectively a bad thing. The U.S. and its allies are right to pursue diplomacy aimed at persuading Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, the U.S.-Israel relationship presents two serious obstacles to such diplomacy. The first is the ever-looming spectre of a unilateral Israeli airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities. It's hard to imagine a scenario in which the Obama administration would approve such a strike, even tacitly -- but because of the strong ties between Washington and Jerusalem, the U.S. would nonetheless be blamed for a such a strike, by regional publics and by the Iranian government.

The prospect of such an attack, ironically, is one reason why the Iranian regime feels compelled to pursue "breakout capacity" for a nuclear weapon.

Secondly, there's Israel's own nuclear weapons program -- rarely acknowledged in the United States, but a major sore point in the region. Israel's neighbors signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and, on balance, they've upheld their obligations: Several have made efforts to develop nuclear weapons, but none finished the job.

Israel, on the other hand, refused to sign the NPT, developed its own clandestine weapons program, and now faces zero pressure from the United States to officially disclose those weapons. Israel's neighbors perceive this as hypocrisy; just last week, Egypt's ambassador to the United Nations called the NPT "a trick." Whether or not you think it's a double standard, Israel's nuclear weapons (and America's tacit acceptance of those weapons) certainly complicate U.S. efforts to dissuade Iran from its nuclear program.

The Arab-Israeli conflict

This should be obvious: America's efforts to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict are not aided by the fact that America is biased towards one party in the conflict. The U.S. isn't perceived as an "honest broker" because -- after decades of condoning illegal Israeli settlements and refusing to sanction Israel for human rights abuses -- it isn't one.

But there's a broader point here, too: America would not feel such an obligation to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict if it wasn't so closely linked to one party. There's a recognition in Washington (well, except at ADL headquarters) that America's image in the Muslim world, and its foreign policy priorities in the region, are inextricably tied up with resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. America's "special relationship" with Israel makes it almost an honorary party to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Other bilateral relationships

Strong U.S.-Israeli ties clearly serve to complicate America's bilateral relationships with other governments in the region. On the other hand, there's no bilateral relationship that's aided by U.S.-Israel ties; there's no government that's more likely to cooperate with Washington because it's so supportive of Israel.

Am I missing something here? To be clear: I'm not advocating that the United States cut ties with Israel, or abandon its efforts to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict or dissuade Iran from its nuclear program. But I see no compelling case for the "special relationship" between Washington and Jerusalem; I see no strategic interest that is served by America's excessive closeness to Israel.

4 Comments

While this essay is correct in not finding benefits to the US commitment to secure Israel, it misses the most important cost.

Broadly speaking, Israel cannot tolerate even moderately powerful neighbors. An Egypt with the economic and/or technological capacity of less-populated South Korea would either be an overwhelming adversary of Israel or contrary to its people's values may be at peace with Israel, but would be one coup election away from being an overwhelming adversary.

This need to limit Egypt's strength is also the case with respect to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Several neighboring countries, if their power reasonably reflected their population and resources could force Israel to accept refugees and end the Jewish majority status that supporters of Zionism consider Israel's reason for existence.

A US commitment to keeping the rest of the region weak enough that it has to accept Israel is expensive not only in the case of Iran, in which case the US is expending huge amounts of financial, military and diplomatic resources to prevent the country from attaining the status legally attained by Brazil, Japan and many other countries but in many many ways throughout the region.

Israel is a tiny, vulnerable country whose creation and perpetuation is widely seen in its region as an injustice. It could never afford itself, to execute the policies the US or someone else must pursue on its behalf in order for it to remain viable. It is the textbook worst possible "ally" or client.

But Israel has US domestic support that, through a powerful lobby, effectively does what every lobby does when it distorts US policy goals and perceptions in Israel's favor.

Israel is a tiny country with 7 million (a quarter of whom are Arabs)population. Meanwhile, that tiny country is surrounded by 300 milion Arabs. Its only the United States that is keeping this artificial entity in existence. Israel is a tyrrany standing on stilts, and thinking its powerful. The day is coming when the illusion under which this farcical contraption, called Israel, is existing will be lifted. And the nakedness of the 'king' will be exposed. Israel is a fake entity, and its must be tamed into reality.

Im not a conspiracy theorist and i agree entirely with the article.

Surely this relationship is simply a holy or to be more accurate "unholy alliance"

The second comming? The Rapture?

To broach in no uncertain terms the idea that the US-Israeli relationship might be a great strategic burden for the US is such a breath of fresh air that the word "pathbreaking" comes to mind. This is a debate long overdue, but amazingly even Washington officials are suddenly--thanks to Netanyahu's self-destructive treatment of Biden but also surely because of Petraeus' January briefing--starting to come out of denial.

Shared values with an Israeli society that bases its foreign policy on brute force and runs an apartheid colonial regime at home?

As for strategic interests, Evans did a brilliant job in his comment. I'll cut to the chase - what kind of friend tries to push one into fighting its wars? Concerning Iran alone, the US is incurring huge costs in Iraq and Afghanistan because of the artificial hostility with Iran on Israel's behalf and all that pales before the potential cost of an actual war with Iran. But even short of military war, the effort to drum up international support for an economic war against Iran is both irritating Russia/China and worrying emerging states like Turkey and Brazil that are naturally our friends.

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