Iraq Withdrawal

Tom Ricks' false choice between occupation and civil war

I've long believed that folks in Washington who want the U.S. to delay its withdrawal from Iraq are really advocating a long-term U.S. military presence in the country. Their basic argument -- Iraq still has problems, so the U.S. can't leave yet -- creates a slippery slope towards lengthy occupation. Tom Ricks is at least honest about this point in his New York Times op-ed today.

Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come.

You guys know how I feel about the Iraq withdrawal timetable, so I won't dwell on all my old arguments: It's a domestic political non-starter; if the "breathing space" created by the surge didn't produce durable results, neither will another 18-month extension; etc. And if Ricks really thinks the Iraqi government will revise the status-of-forces agreement to extend the U.S. occupation -- well, he's wrong. Some Iraqi politicians might support that in private, but none will say so in public.

I do want to take a moment, though, to diagnose the fundamental problem with Ricks' op-ed: It creates a false choice between long-term occupation and Iraqi civil war. I don't know many journalists or analysts (or Iraqis) who think another civil war is in the cards. Iraqis are tired of sectarianism; they don't want their country to return to the chaos of 2005 or 2006.

Nir Rosen, whose work I respect tremendously -- In the Belly of the Green Bird is the best street-level reporting on the early days of the Iraq war -- made exactly this argument yesterday, on Ricks' own blog.

When you talk to people they tell you that the sectarian phase is over. Of course with enough fear it could come back, but Shiites do not feel threatened by any other group, and Sunnis aren't being rounded up, the security forces provide decent enough security, and they are pervasive, there is no reason for people to cling to militias in self defense and besides militiamen are still being rounded up, I just don't see enough fuel here for a conflagration -- leaving aside the Arab/Kurdish fault line, of course.

The real fear -- the reason I'm so concerned about the de-Ba'athification crisis, for example -- is that current events in Iraq are sowing the seeds of long-term conflict. The Iraqi insurgency is a shell of its former self, but maybe years of low-level Sunni violence against the government will propel a Shi'ite strongman into power. The Iraqi economy is in shambles, and the country still doesn't have an oil law; poverty and desperation could produce violent and unpredictable results. The Arab-Kurd issue is a potential flashpoint.

None of these conflicts are going to boil over in the next year or two, though. They're long-term Iraqi problems that demand Iraqi solutions. U.S. Central Command can't force the Iraqi parliament to adopt a hydrocarbons law or resolve the status of Kirkuk -- and unless parliament is willing to do those things, it doesn't matter how long the U.S. occupies Iraq.

*deep breath* I'm tired of writing about this subject; you're probably tired of reading about it. Hopefully this is my last word for a while on the Iraq withdrawal timetable. But, again -- President Obama is doing exactly the right thing by sticking to that timetable.

5 Comments

The problem with Tom Ricks' editorial is that he knows very little about Iraq. His ungoing series on his blog "Iraq the unraveling" is close to ambulance chasing comments about the country. A typical post is, Iraqi soldier and police got into a shoot out. I don't know why but I'm sure more of this will happen in the future. He believes that the Surge didn't achieve its goals and just froze everything in place, so as soon as the U.S. withdraws everyone will go back to fighting. When I've asked him what will be the motivations for a return to fighting he's never really said why. When I asked him to do some research into attacks and deaths to give some context behind his posts about violence to see whether they have gone up or down, he told me that statistics can be misleading. So he works at a think tank, says Iraq has shaped his whole career, but can't take the time to do any actual research into it. I think that basically sums up his writing on the subject.

Typical Ricks. He states that staying in Iraq could deter a "civil war" without actually laying out how, or why, Iraq would spiral back into such violent chaos upon US departure. Ugh.

Actually, Jwing, what I believe I said was that my experience in Iraq is that statistics there are profoundly misleading. For example, I was once interviewing a sewer pump worker in SW Baghdad and asked him what his biggest problem was. He said it was the bodies clogging the filters. What does that tell you about statistics that assumed that morgue admission numbers were the equivalent of the death rate? And what does your experience in Iraq tell you?

@Tom:

I'm obviously not JWing but I'm just wondering...

For example, I was once interviewing a sewer pump worker in SW Baghdad and asked him what his biggest problem was. He said it was the bodies clogging the filters. What does that tell you about statistics that assumed that morgue admission numbers were the equivalent of the death rate?

... what exactly are you reading into things like these? Did you assume that these unaccounted for bodies were the result of sectarian violence/terrorism related, and thus it would be wise of us to stay for a while longer? And if so, why? I don't necessarily doubt that the statistics have flaws or miss quite a few people in shuffle, but I'm not exactly sure what you're trying to tie these sorts of anecdotes to in the broader scheme of things.

Tom,

I've never said that the stats are perfect. Obviously with deaths for example there are many that are never reported. However, my main problem with your reporting is that anecdotal stories like you just gave actually proves nothing. Plus you refuse to analyze them, which is why I said it's like ambulance chasing. Look here at this attack, yet you give no context and do not attempt to analyze them. Plus if you can't tell the difference between over 2,000 people killed a month and the current levels than I have even more questions about your views.

Also I always ask you for motivations. What will be the reason why people are going to go back to the civil war? You've been saying that there may be a Shiite on Shiite fight coming up for example? Which Shiites will be fighting and why? You never answer.

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