The ElBaradei campaign in a post-Hosni world, ctd.

Gregg Carlstrom's comments on my post are thoughtful, and the questions he raises about my argument are valid. To clarify, I do not think that there is any scenario for Egypt after Hosni Mubarak in which the armed forces, the security services and higher-level elements of the state bureaucracy will not play an important role. This is also true for a scenario by which the ElBaradei platform and campaign -- if not the man himself -- would create enough popular and elite momentum to definitively block Gamal Mubarak or (much less likely) cause the end of Hosni Mubarak's reign. Only in cases of revolution do state institutions that wield coercive or political power find themselves unable to retain that power. The scenario I described is one whereby these institutions decide to act on popular sentiment to avert a bigger crisis, or one in which they otherwise find themselves convinced that intervention is a better alternative to the status-quo. It would be an opportunity for the powers-that-be to acquiesce to some of the demands (constitutional reform, the end of the emergency law, police reform, etc.) and begin a gradual reform of the political system. Turkey followed such a route even though the military remained powerful. Russia's opening after the fall of the Soviet Union was in part due to KGB willingness to support a political change, even if has been modest and perhaps reversed under Vladimir Putin. Lech Walesa's political rise in Poland took place with the support of some within the state apparatus. These power elites can negotiate with demands for more democracy while safeguarding at least some of their interests. No one expects Egypt to become a Jeffersonian democracy overnight.

Of course, the "coming confusion" as you describe it could overshadow the ElBaradei movement, but its goals remain widely shared by a lot of the opposition and have become an important part of how the public imagines a better Egypt. Inter-regime rivalries could dominate for a while after Hosni Mubarak is no longer in the picture. But, eventually, if the quality of governance does not improve in Egypt, the same demands for reform will be made. A new regime will have the opportunity to buttress its popularity -- and perhaps just as importantly, its image abroad -- by embracing them and rejecting at least part of the legacy of Mubarakism. This is the thinking of some (from across the political spectrum: liberal, socialist, Islamist, pro-Western, etc.) in the opposition and why they see military intervention at some point not only a likely alternative, but also a desirable one.