Why the de-Ba'athification crisis matters: Worrisome signs for the future

I was chatting earlier with a friend who works on Capitol Hill, and he made the point that this crisis probably won't lead to any immediate catastrophe. I agree: In the end, the election will probably be held on time; the big-name candidates (Salah al-Mutlak, Dhafer al-Ani, Abdul-Qadir Jassem al-Obeidi) will likely be allowed to run; the Sunnis will not stage a boycott (despite threats to that effect).

So what's the big deal here? Why am I running around calling this a crisis?

Because this election -- neither free nor fair at this point -- helps sow the seeds of future sectarian unrest. Sunni turnout won't be zero, but it will definitely be depressed. Some Sunnis won't vote because their preferred candidates were de-Ba'athified; others will stay home because they think the government in Baghdad is dominated by Shi'ites and biased against Sunnis.

There's a legitimate lingering concern about the Ba'ath, which is reportedly responsible for some of the horrific mass-casualty bombings in Baghdad over the last eight months. But, as The Economist notes, there are no parliamentary candidates with demonstrated links to the party. So many Sunnis view the de-Ba'athification insanity as a way to keep them out of politics.

And it's spreading outside Baghdad, too. The Najaf government demanded last month that all suspected Ba'athists leave the province (عربي). And the Karbala government announced today (عربي) that it's forming its own provincial de-Ba'athification committee -- a very dangerous precedent.

As we've said numerous times before on this blog, the de-Ba'athification decisions will also strengthen Iraq's sectarian parties at the expense of its multi-sectarian coalitions. I'll quote from that Economist article I linked above:

In any event, the issue has badly damaged the election prospects of alliances seeking to rise above sectarian prejudice. With other moderate leaders, Nuri al-Maliki, the prime minister, had been building up one of three non-sectarian alliances, uniting Sunnis and Shias on a single electoral ticket. Voters seemed to approve, giving him strong support in last year's provincial elections that were seen as a dry run for this year's general one. Mr Maliki had hoped to change the violent and divisively sectarian nature of Iraqi politics.

[...] So sectarian rivalry is once again to the fore. The two non-religious alliances competing against Mr Maliki's front are running out of candidates. Mr Mutlaq had a promising liaison with Iyad Allawi, a Shia, who was a tough, secular-minded former prime minister. But between them they may lose 72 candidates to deBaathification. An alliance between Jawad al-Bolani, the Shia interior minister, and Ahmed abu Risha, a Sunni tribal lord, could lose 67.

Finally, the de-Ba'athification decisions will also hurt Iraq's relations with its Sunni Arab neighbors. Iraqi-Syrian relations are already strained over accusations that Syria is harboring Ba'athists; Iraqi-Jordanian tensions have ratcheted up in recent weeks. The de-Ba'athification decisions, viewed as anti-Sunni, won't help matters.

None of these things will send Iraq back to sectarian warfare next month. But they are worrisome portents for Iraq's future.