Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad speaking Sunday at the Exhibition of Iran Laser Science and Technology.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speaking Sunday at a conference to showcase advancements in laser technology, ordered the head of his country's Atomic Energy Agency to find a way to enrich uranium to a more easily weaponized level.
The speech has made waves in the Western media, though the news is fairly light: Ahmadinejad told Ali Akbar Salehi, the atomic energy chief, to begin drawing up plans to produce more highly enriched uranium, not to actually do it. But as with all things Iran-related (e.g. last week's news about accelerating U.S. deployments in the Gulf) the slightest bit of change becomes magnified.
The Iranian leadership may have intended to use Ahmadinejad's announcement as leverage to win more concessions in negotiations with the West, but negative reaction from several countries was swift.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates urged the world to "stand together" and give targeted sanctions against Iran a chance, according to the BBC. Britain's Foreign Office said the announcement was "clearly a matter of serious concern," while German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg said "patience is at an end," according to Iranian state-owned Press TV.
But Ahmadinejad's posturing follows in a long line of Iranian negotiating tradition: make quiet assurances that you will agree to an offer from the West, quibble over aspects of the offer, then find a technicality to use as an escape and claim that the West has violated trust or somehow not followed through.
Last week, Ahmadinejad said he would have "no problem" agreeing to an offer made in October by the International Atomic Energy Agency that would have sent 1,200 kilograms of Iran's low-enriched uranium out of the country to be further enriched. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki reiterated Iran's apparent willingness to negotiate on Friday, telling the annual Munich Security Conference that "we are approaching a final agreement."
Yet today, Ahmadinejad said this to the technology conference, according to Press TV:
I had said let us give the world powers two to three months and if they don't agree, we would start ourselves ... Now Dr. Salehi, start to make the 20 percent with the centrifuges.
There's some logical dissonance there, no? The IAEA made its offer in October. Iran at first appeared to accept, then backed away, then inched back toward some kind of modified deal. The West began losing patience, Iran promised it was serious, and now Ahmadinejad is claiming that nothing new has been on the table for two to three months. Again, this is Iranian negotiating.
Iran currently possesses stockpiles of what is known as low-enriched uranium, where the quantity of the fissile uranium-235 isotope is somewhere around 3 to 5 percent. On Sunday, Ahmadinejad ordered Salehi to find a way to bring the level of that isotope to 20 percent, creating highly enriched uranium that could be used in a crude nuclear weapon.
Iran claims that it wants to use the highly enriched uranium at the Tehran Research Reactor and that it must do the enriching itself since the IAEA and the other negotiating partners won't agree to its terms, such as the shrinking of a 12-month window where Iran will part with its uranium to four or five months.
But it's unclear whether Iran even has the capability to enrich its uranium to that level on its own, the New York Times' Michael Slackman reported from Cairo today:
Doing so would require retooling the configuration of the nation's centrifuges at a moment when Iran appears to have run into considerable technical difficulties at its nuclear plants.
It is unclear if those troubles have been caused either by its own technical failings, or sabotage by Western intelligence agencies, or both. American intelligence officials have told Congress and close allies, in closed briefings, that covert efforts to interfere with Iran's production capability are extremely active.
The United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia all seem to support some form of international sanctions on Iran. China, the fifth permanent member of the Security Council, has repeatedly signaled its opposition. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives have passed similar bills that would sanction companies that supply refined gasoline to Iran and tighten technology exports. The two bodies still need to reconcile their bills, and President Obama may not, in the end, sign a law that approves a broad gasoline sanction. But the international sanction consensus does seem to be growing.
In that sense, Ahmadinejad's gamesmanship could backfire. It's possible that, behind the scenes, Iran has reached some kind of deal with the P5+1 and IAEA to send its low-enriched uranium out of the country for some shortened period of time, and that's why Mottaki has been making his positive remarks recently. If that's the case, what purpose does Ahmadinejad's speech serve. Doesn't it run the risk of derailing whatever agreement may be close to getting reached? Then again, that could be the intent. It's always hard to tell what the Iranian government intends.
For updates throughout the day, follow us on 
Twitter, 
Facebook or 
RSS!
Categories: Diplomacy, Iran, Obama Administration, Politics, Proliferation, Regional News
Tags: Ali Akbar Salehi, Atomic Energy Agency, International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran, Iranian nuclear program, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, P5+1
5 Comments
If there is indeed a deal struck on the nuclear issue, Ahmadinejad's posturing is likely done for domestic purposes, and the language definitely fits.
Likewise, Ahmadinejad's power base has been in shambles since the election, and one of the few things that still give him legitimacy (vis-a-vis his powerbase) is the nuclear issue (in addition, it perpetrates a crisis atmosphere in Tehran, making Iran relatively easier to manage). Should the nuclear issue go away, the pro-Ahmadinejad camp would diminish further, unless the Pasdaran were onboard with this decision.
Now Iran is claiming nothing new has been on the table for two to three months.
I've been surprised at the inflexibility of the West on this issue. It has not been explained and given what is known in public, does not really make sense.
Arnold -
I think there's room for debate on this issue. Since much of the negotiating doesn't occur in public, it's hard to tell who might be acting unreasonably.
That said, I have to believe, as I wrote in the post, that Iran is the intransigent one. The IAEA (the West) made an offer, Iran said it would accept, but then backed away and tried to modify the conditions. Not to treat the issue of nuclear proliferation with too much levity, but this is kind of like if you were haggling for jewelry in the market, the shop owner said, "OK, 50," you agreed, and then as he started handing you the merchandise, you said, "No, 30."
While Iran is a sovereign nation with the right to nuclear power, it seems from my outsider's perspective that at least for the purposes of the current negotiations, it has not acted like an honest party.
While Iran is a sovereign nation with the right to nuclear power, it seems from my outsider's perspective that at least for the purposes of the current negotiations, it has not acted like an honest party.
I'd be shocked if ANY of the countries at the negotiating table have acted honestly during this whole situation.
Iran actually never said it would accept the offer presented in late October. What was offered in late October was really a bad offer - as you say and I agree, I can only go by what's public and I know that is not the whole offer but based on what's in view it is a bad offer.
Iran agreed in early October to the broad concept of a swap. At the time no details had been presented. But once details were presented, that 1200kgs have to leave Iran at once and Iran would have to trust that France would return the fuel later. (Given that Iranian trust that Russia would start Bushehr has been thwarted for years and also given that France has said it wants Iran to stop enriching before it works on Iran's behalf.) Iran reasonably insisted that these details would have to be adjusted.
Either way, just going from what has been said publicly, Iran certainly is justified in claiming that no new deal has been put on the table since October. That is specifically US and Western policy that the deal is not to be re-negotiated. What is presented as Ahmadinejad's claim ("Ahmadinejad is claiming that nothing new has been on the table for two to three months") is actually a true statement. I don't think there can be an argument over that.
If you're saying Iran at some point after the October 19th meeting said it would accept the deal presented, you have some source of information I don't. By that time everything Iran said in public was that the deal as presented was unacceptable.
If you're saying that Iran accepted the principle of a swap around October 1 when discussions of a swap first became public, then that is not accepting the deal, because the terms of the deal were still being negotiated.
No Iranian has ever, to my knowledge, said it is ok to export 1200 kgs of LEU to get reactor fuel a year later. When Iran rejected that October 19 proposal, it was not going back on anything. Iran was still saying that the concept of a swap is acceptable if the deal is structured in a satisfactory way.
Iran's position is that the deal presented in late October is unsatisfactory. That has been Iran's consistent position since that deal was presented. The claim that Iran at first accepted the deal is the result of confusing the actually presented deal with the concept of the deal before it was given specific terms. Even then though, Iran's position has been consistent.
The US' position is that the deal presented in late October is to be taken or left.
From what we know about the deal, it is very easy to see why Iran has always considered it unsatisfactory. It is also hard to call the party whose position is that further negotiation is necessary intransigent while the party whose position is that the terms cannot change is not intransigent.
Post a Comment