Nuclear Negotiations
The grand (and mythical) alliance against Iran
If you believe the latest meme going around Washington, Arab states are fed up with Iran, and willing to set aside their enmity towards Israel and the United States in order to confront the perceived Persian menace. Tom Ricks summed up this thinking quite nicely in what has to be the most muddled blog post he's ever written.
I wonder if something fundamental is going on in the Middle East. That is, Iran is getting more powerful, and that scares the Arab states. So they seem to be turning away from worrying about Israel and focusing more on Iran as it moves toward becoming a nuclear power.
Michael Totten makes a similar argument over in Commentary, though he at least tries to substantiate it with some polling data; Ricks just typed up a dorm room bull session and slapped a vaguely offensive picture on the top.
It's true that Arabs are concerned about Iran's nuclear program -- and Arab governments want the U.S. to take an aggressive line with Iran. But there's little evidence that Arab publics think Iran is the new public enemy #1.
Totten bases his argument on this proposition -- which is also repeated by a Financial Times article about the polling data he cites:
According to a new study of public opinion by the folks who host the Doha Debates in Qatar, a clear majority in 18 Arab countries now thinks Iran poses a greater threat to security in the Middle East than Israel.
Just one problem: If you look at the actual polling data (pdf), it says no such thing. Respondents are worried about Iran: A plurality thinks Iran is more likely to use nuclear weapons against an Arab country than against Israel, and 68 percent think Iran wants to build nuclear weapons to "dominate the region."
But nowhere do they call Iran a bigger threat than Israel.
Compare Totten's claim with the annual (and well-respected) UMD/Zogby Arab public opinion survey (pdf). The survey does find widespread concern about Iran's nuclear program: 58 percent of respondents think Iran wants nuclear weapons, and 40 percent support "pressur[ing] Iran to stop its program."
Further on, though, the poll asks respondents to pick the two countries "that you think pose the biggest threat to you." Israel is first, at 88 percent; the United States is second, at 77 percent. Iran (13 percent) comes in slightly ahead of China (9 percent).
And then there's this study from Saudi Arabia. Totten cites the headline: One-third of Saudis support a U.S. attack on Iran, and nearly one-quarter would endorse an Israeli attack. But he ignores the more important finding further down.
In response to an open-ended question about the greatest external threats to their country, many of the Saudis cited issues of terrorism or religious extremism. In fact, these issues led the list by a large margin, with each garnering around 20 percent of total first mentions. Issues related to Iran and Israel lagged far behind, barely registering in double digits even when first and second mentions were combined. On a related question, more than half (54 percent) of urban Saudis said that "religious extremism is a serious problem" in their country, including 28 percent who strongly believe this.
Polling in the Arab world is difficult. But the data we have suggests that Arab publics do not view Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat. They're worried about it -- but when asked to place it on a list of threats, it tends to rank fairly low. There's little evidence to suggest Arab polities are preparing to set aside their dislike for America and Israel and join the U.S. in some kind of grand alliance against Iran.







3 Comments
I am not convinced that polling data of Arab publics matters all that much in disproving the argument that "Arab states are fed up with Iran, and willing to set aside their enmity towards Israel and the United States in order to confront the perceived Persian menace."
Polling data is often used as a tangible way to demonstrate a particular point, but public opinion does not play the deciding role in shaping regional policies of Arab governments. Arab publics have very little influence over their government's policies toward Iran, or in shaping alliances in the region in general. To the degree that Arab public opinion does matter, that is why many of the discussions of the Iranian threat are held privately amongst Arab officials, and not publicly.
One should remain skeptical of the accuracy of polling data in the region, as well as making any conclusions based on that data, whether accurate or not.
Ricks pretty clearly says Arab "states."
And as the first commenter noted, polling of the Arab public should also been judged critically, as one basic rule of survey research is that a population under constant economic or physical duress make for a poor sampling of consistent opinion. At least one, if not both of those are rather common in most Arab states.
And whether the data is accurate or not, these people are mostly powerless. They have no impact on the actual policies their respective governments take toward Iran. Ricks mistakenly believes there to be a policy shift, when in fact iran has always been of great concern to Arab regimes - especially the Gulf states.
But his focus was very much on the thinking of those who call the shots.
Megadittoes, Kevin!
Best,
Tom Ricks
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