Nobody puts Berri in the corner

Berri has called for the formation of a commission to consider abolishing sectarianism. Currently, political power is shared along major confessional lines: Shi'ites, Sunnis, Maronites, Druze and others each have allotted quotas of seats in Parliament, and Lebanon's top three political positions -- President, Prime Minister and Speaker -- are reserved for a Christian, Sunni and Shia, respectively.

The country's unique history necessitated the system, but times have changed, and for one thing, Lebanon's Muslim population has probably outstripped its Christian population in recent years, rendering out of date the current 50-50 Parliamentary split between the two dominant religions. But the suggestion of abolishing sectarianism threatens entrenched interests and behaviors, making change exceedingly difficult.

"Change to the established political arrangement is so sensitive that even a small chance of its being implemented has thrown the system into a minor state of disarray," writes Michael Prothero in the National.

Christian politician Michael Aoun, the head of the Free Patriotic Movement, and Saad Hariri, Lebanon's Sunni prime minister and the leader of the liberal-minded March 14 coalition, have both signaled initial opposition to Berri. Elias Muhanna finds that ironic, since both Aoun and Hariri's parties are ostensibly also dedicate to de-sectarianization.

Muhanna also criticizes "liberal-minded civil society types" for their "shoot-the-messenger" criticism. "The argument runs as follows: Abolishing sectarianism is important and necessary, but not if Nabih Berri is proposing it," Muhanna wrote on Monday.

The problem is that Berri is Shia, so his argument looks a little self-serving, since most people assume that the Shias constitute the largest confessional bloc in Lebanon right now. (I say assume, because nobody has conducted an accurate or trusted census in the country for decades, as far as I know.) The liberal-minded types Muhanna tweaks in his post fear that Berri is only interested in increasing the power of his own sect, a sect which also happens to identity overwhelmingly with Hizballah.

Hariri and others understandably fear a scenario where sectarian quotas are abolished, and Shias suddenly skyrocket from 21 percent of Parliament to a strong plurality. There are 27 Shia seats in Lebanon's 128-seat Parliament right now. But most unofficial estimates put the Shia population of Lebanon at 40 percent. Assuming a theoretical one-to-one ratio after the abolishing of sectarianism, Shiites would win around 51 seats. This is just back-of-the-napkin math here, but such a gain would also probably mean a jump in Hizballah representation, from the party's current 13 seats to perhaps somewhere around 24.

Hizballah now exists as a non-state militia with a policy platform and representation in Lebanon's Parliament. It is, in its own words, an armed resistance movement, and one that has proven willing as recently as a couple years ago to use its firepower to intimidate political rivals. A Hizballah emboldened by a Shia plurality finally able to flex its political muscles would never consent to giving up its weapons, a key part of normalizing Lebanon's government and politics, the liberal thinking goes.

Muhanna correctly argues that ongoing "national dialogue" talks are not going to disarm Hizballah in the near future, and that the idea of abolishing sectarianism would probably not catch as much flak if it was coming from Hariri or Aoun's mouth.

I personally think that the idea of state-sanctioned sectarianism is dangerous, though it was worked reasonably well in Lebanon for around half a century. A move to a more pure, democratic system of representation is necessary, but I understand the argument the "liberal-minded" types are making for a take-it-slow approach. If there's one thing more dangerous and destabilizing for a country than basing its political representation on religion, its allowing one of those religions to run a militia that has instigated or participated in multiple "wars" with neighboring Israel.

Muhanna acknowledges that such a scenario probably won't come to pass: "None of the other parties are going to accept a non-confessional system that allows one party to maintain a militia that is stronger than the Lebanese Army," he writes. So then the problem seems to be more logistical than anything -- Lebanon needs de-sectarianization (or deconfessionalism, as Muhanna terms it) and Hizballah needs to disarm, both are inevitabilities that will take many years to come about, Muhanna is just a little ticked that liberals are giving Berri such a hard time.

I see it as a natural process. There needs to be resistance in order for their to be an equitable solution. Christians (and non-Shia Muslims) can't give Hizballah an easy power grab, and Berri is an unpalatable messenger, as Muhanna notes, since he's been so entrenched in sectarian cronyism in Lebanon for decades. Abolishing sectarianism in Lebanon could even be seen as a carrot for Hariri, Aoun and others to offer Hasan Nasrallah: "We'll double your political power if you start to demilitarize." Gregg and I have written several times recently about Hizballah's moderation, which I personally view as authentic. Perhaps deconfessionalism/de-sectarianism presents an opportunity to test that theory.