Obama's limited engagement with Iran

Obama's engagement with Iran seems predicated on the idea that the nuclear program is purely a bargaining chip -- something the regime would gladly exchange for improved relations with the West. That might be true of other countries (North Korea comes to mind), but it overlooks the array of concerns -- foreign and domestic -- that motivate Iran's nuclear program.

The regime has turned it into a matter of national pride, creating a "rally-round-the-flag" effect. The regime also feels threatened -- by Israel, and by the U.S. presence on its eastern and western flanks -- and views a nuclear weapon, or at least a weapons program, as an effective deterrent.

A Persian bomb would also tip the regional balance of power, giving Iran an edge over the Sunni Arab countries which have traditionally been heavyweights in Persian Gulf geopolitics.

Obama's outreach -- while it certainly goes beyond that of his predecessors -- is more symbolic than substantive: It contains nothing to change Iran's strategic calculus. Obama's outreach also has not meaningfully changed Western rhetoric towards Iran. Israel still talks openly about potential military action; prominent Washington think tanks hold public conferences to debate the idea. U.S. policymakers talk often of economic sanctions, and periodically remind Iran that military action is still an option.

The last three decades of U.S.-Iranian relations have been characterized by hostility, mistrust and mutual suspicion. Is it any surprise that the Iranian regime -- presented with a limited offer of engagement, at the price of its main asymmetric strategic advantage -- didn't accept?