Betting on Syria?

Badran says Saudi Arabia has incorrectly leapt on the bandwagon of those trying to bring Syria in from the cold and mentions "recent and ridiculously inept political moves" by the Saudis, though I must confess I don't know what he's talking about. He identifies the undermining of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq as a joint interest of Saudi Arabia and Syria that might be driving this apparent rapprochement.

To back up his pessimistic view, Badran cites two recent opinion pieces - not hard news, mind you, since facts are inconvenient things for op-ed writers - that appeared in the National and the Jerusalem Post.

In the National piece, political editor Emile Hokayem writes that the recent formation of a unity government in Lebanon was actually a victory for Assad. This line of thinking, of course, stems from the oft-invoked theory that political actors inside Lebanon are nothing but extensions of Syria and Saudi Arabia - maybe it's true, but we here at the Majlis are still waiting for some kind of proof on that. (Jonathan Spyer, writing in the Post, called the new unity government an "effective surrender of pro-Saudi forces in that country to the allies of Iran and Syria.")

Hokayem's view, which seems to be shared by Badran and Spyer, is that Syria has no real interest in peace as an objective in and of itself. Rather, Assad views the peace process as "a way to increase [Syria's] regional influence." Therefore, a "Syrian track" would be "at best a distraction, at worse a setback for the overall peace venture," in Hokayem's view.

Spyer admits, given the impotence of the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, that engaging Syria in the process "could provide the illusion of diplomatic motion," a plus for an Israeli administration viewed as standoffish. But he too has no faith that Syria will not budge on what Israel and the West want the most: a strategic realignment away from Iran. Even an Israeli offer to return some or all of the Golan Heights can't buy that, Spyer believes.

The reasons are fairly obvious. Syria's current stance of alliance with Iran gives the Damascus regime most of what it needs. Syria is seen as a vital part of any regional diplomatic process, because of its ability to spoil progress through its alignment with radical forces.

Spyer believes that the Saudis and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have essentially bestowed improved relations on Syria without requiring anything in return. Assad has not been forced to modify his relationship with Iran or with "terror organizations in Lebanon, Iraq and among the Palestinians," Spyer writes.

All three authors are thankful for President Obama's go-slow approach toward Syria; though the U.S. has plans to send an ambassador to Damascus for the first time since the Bush administration withdrew its representative following the car bombing of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Obama has renewed sanctions and the administration hasn't made any serious concessions.

Yet Obama and his Middle East team have also suffered from vague policy goals, Badran & Co. argue.

[The] lack of a coherent and forcefully articulated strategy understanding of regional dynamics on the part of the US (and, I would add, as Michael Young has done, US ambiguity on Iraq) has allowed for secondary players like France and Saudi Arabia to step forward in an exercise of virtual diplomacy, which nevertheless can potentially have a real impact on US interests.

I'm willing to agree with the three that the Obama administration, especially regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, seems to have a lack of will. I mean, how many times does Israel have to break ground on a new settlement - sorry, suburb - in the West Bank before it's clear that the U.S. call for a "freeze" was nothing but hot air? Obama's Cairo speech did a nice rhetorical job of sending friendly signals to Muslims and Arabs, but what did it mean for foreign policy? I suppose we're starting to see the answer.

Perhaps there is a genuine desire to bring Syria in from the cold. If Assad isn't willing to give up most of his relationships with Iran and Hizballah, then there's little to be gained by shifting to a more bellicose policy. If the U.S. can induce Syria to not meddle in certain key affairs, then maybe Assad doesn't need to make some kind of abrupt realignment away from Iran. It will be interesting to see Assad, as has been rumored, is thinking about acknowledging his country's nuclear program in a Qadhafi-like maneuver - that may indicate that he is open to some substantive progress.