Washington's limited influence in Sana'a

Yemen faces a complicated web of problems, and it's reductive to focus simply on the insurgency and al-Qaeda. Indeed, many of these problems are intertwined. Yemen's low level of economic development, and its ineffective governance, create and reinforce economic hardship in the north, which has become one of the Huthis' stated grievances; the government's focus on the Huthis has distracted attention from al-Qaeda; and so on.

The White House will probably identify al-Qaeda as its chief national interest in Yemen, but any "Yemen policy" needs to be broader than just counterterrorism; it needs to promote economic development and better governance. (This was the most important conclusion from the CNAS report.).

Politically, though, Obama has little clear leverage over the Yemeni government. His relationship with Yemen to date has focused on counterterrorism: John Brennan, Obama's homeland security adviser, met with president Ali Abdullah Saleh in September and expressed the administration's support for fighting al-Qaeda.

Obama, like his predecessor, has said little about governance or economic development, and it's not clear why Saleh would respond to such demands. It's true that Western aid props up Saleh's regime, as the Economist noted in September -- but it's also doubtful that Saleh would respond to threats to cut off that aid.

With limited political leverage, the Obama administration might decide to focus on economic development. If the U.S. can help to reduce the grievances that animate the Huthis and the separatist movement, perhaps Yemen will stabilize and the Saleh government will take a tougher line on al-Qaeda.

But the administration faces a problem of resources. In a perfect world, USAID would launch a spate of development projects across the country. It's doubtful that USAID can muster the personnel to run these programs, though. The State Department is having enough trouble staffing its "civilian surge" in Afghanistan - the Obama administration's stated #1 priority - so I can't see where it finds staff to work in Yemen.

Counterterrorism aid, but will Yemen want it?

Obama has very perhaps the most leverage along a military axis: The U.S. already provides Yemen with counterterrorism assistance, and if the White House feels al-Qaeda in Yemen is a growing problem, it can step up the assistance.

Here, though, it faces a mismatch of interests. The CNAS report faults Saleh for his "insufficient will to combat al-Qaeda elements." But this is a perfectly rational policy from Saleh's perspective: The government feels far more threatened by the Huthi insurgency and the separatist movement in the south. Al-Qaeda is a distant third concern.

That wasn't true in the early part of the decade, when Saleh felt chiefly threatened by Al-Qaeda. He enjoyed a close relationship with then-President George W. Bush; starting in 2002, Yemen worked closely with the United States to conduct counterterrorism operations. Saleh even approved a U.S. missile strike on a car carrying six Yemeni terrorists in November 2002.

But today, with Saleh focused on separatists and insurgents, he will be less responsive to pressure to fight al-Qaeda.

None of this is to say that the U.S. shouldn't pursue a new approach to Yemen. Obama should certainly lean on Saleh to improve governance; USAID should devote whatever resources it can to economic development. But the Obama administration needs to recognize that it has, at best, limited capacity to influence events.

Instead, at least for the short term, Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue to be the main players in Yemen. (Three Saudi soldiers were reportedly killed today by Huthi rebels, so expect Saudi Arabia to continue expanding its involvement in Yemen in the days to come.)