Okay, as promised, some more detail on this afternoon's "Iraq in 2020" panel at the Middle East Institute conference. The whole concept was something of a conceit -- as a reader pointed out, there's a lot of uncertainty about Iraq in 2010 -- so most of the panel focused on shorter-term concerns.
I complained earlier about the lack of focus on economics. The panel mostly focused on politics and diplomacy -- how Iraqis will reconcile internally, and how they'll relate to their neighbors (and the U.S.) externally. What really struck me was the divergence between the American panelists, who tended to be more optimistic about the future, and the Iraqi panelists, who seemed pessimistic about intractable problems of Iraqi governance.
The American perspective
The most immediate concern, of course, is the parliamentary election scheduled for January 21. The Iraqi parliament managed to avert a looming crisis by passing an election law on Sunday. But there's still a lot of uncertainty about the vote: What will turnout be like? Will the losers accept their defeat or turn to violence?
"In the run-up to elections, everyone is on their best behavior," said James Dobbins, a fellow at the RAND Corporation. "It's the period after, when power-sharing deals are made, and there are clear losers... and no tradition of good losers."
Sectarianism is also a concern. Prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition cuts across sectarian lines: It includes a Kurdish party, a Turkmen party, and a smattering of Sunni lawmakers. But there are rumors that the ISCI-Sadrist alliance (the Iraqi National Alliance) is pressuring Maliki to join -- essentially creating a unified Shi'ite front in 2010.
Michael Corbin, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, said that would be a worrisome sign for Iraq.
"The Sunnis are participating, but they're so divided, and their expectations are very low," Corbin said. "We haven't seen sectarian parties yet... but if Maliki joins the Iraqi National Alliance, it will show he's moving away from multi-sectarian coalitions, and that's a bad sign."
Regardless of what happens in January, Dobbins said the U.S. should continue with its withdrawal on schedule, but should base its deployment grid around "hot spots" in Iraq. Kirkuk would almost certainly be the last place from which U.S. combat troops withdraw.
Corbin also said the U.S. would maintain its provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq until 2012. The PRTs were an important part of the population-centric counterinsurgency of the surge years, but there's been a lot of recent uncertainty over their fate. A State Department inspector general report released in July recommended reducing the 14 PRTs down to six.
One detail Corbin left out was security: Who will protect the PRTs? Corbin said they would "work closely" with U.S. advisory and assistance brigades, the 50,000 troops that will remain in Iraq between 2010 and 2012. But the A&A brigades are not supposed to conduct combat operations, which leaves uncertainty about how the PRTs will be protected.
The Iraqi perspective
So that was the U.S. assessment -- focused mostly on high-level politics and the security situation. The two Iraqis on the panel talked more about the realities of governance, and they were less optimistic. Rend Rahim Francke, Iraq's first ambassador to the U.S. after the 2003 invasion, said that -- six years later -- Iraq still lacks "institutions or a functioning state."
"The Iraqi people are unhappy. The turnout for provincial elections [in January] was disappointing... there's a sense that the government is losing credibility with the population at large," she said.
Francke pointed to a number of tensions within Iraq -- between sects, and between the Kurdish regional government and the central government in Baghdad. She described Iraq as "well on the way" to adopting a more decentralized system of government, though she said the KRG model "would not be replicated."
Ali Allawi, a former member of the Interim Iraq Governing Council, described corruption as an intractable problem for the Iraqi government.
"Corruption in Iraq is institutionalized," Allawi said. "The larger cases were exposed by the press, the actors were known, but there was not the political will to bring them to justice. The scale of corruption goes beyond just [bribery]. It goes to theft of state assets."
Francke and Allawi were both unsure what role Iraq would play in the region over the next few years -- and what role its neighbors would play in Iraqi politics. Iran, in particular, is a complicated case study: Does the Iranian government merely want to use Iraq as a proxy against the United States? Or is Iran's heavy hand in Iraqi politics a reflection of the Persian state's desire for greater clout in the region?
Allawi, perhaps unintentionally, had the most telling line of the afternoon (emphasis mine):
"The most important partner that's not regional is the United States," he said.
As Tom Ricks put it in September: One of the greatest beneficiaries of our war in Iraq has been Iran.
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Categories: Iraq, Regional News, War and Terrorism, War in Iraq
Tags: Ali Allawi, Iraqi election law, Iraqi parliament, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Michael Corbin, Middle East Institute, Nouri al-Maliki, Rend Rahim Francke, Sadrist movement, State of Law
2 Comments
Maliki's State of Law is about as cross-sectarian as the National Alliance is. Those other parties are just window dressing because Maliki's Dawa is the driving force behind the List. For example, both lists have one token Sunni party, both of which are Awakening leaders from Anbar.
What the main difference between them is not the parties that are included but their rhetoric. This is hardly ever picked up on in Western reports. Maliki is talking about Iraqi nationalism, while the National Alliance has nothing holding it together other than their sectarian identity. The Sadrists and SIIC for example, agree upon nearly nothing other than not liking Maliki.
2nd in response to Dobbins comment that Iraq doesn't have a history of good losers isn't quite true. The results of the 2009 provincial elections went well across the country except in Ninewa where the Kurds are mad at the winning al-Hadbaa party.
3rd Francke said that Iraq was moving towards a decentralized governing system. Where's the evidence of that? Maliki is trying to increase the power of the central government, and overall Iraq still runs on a Soviet centralized system. None of the ministries can act without the approval of the minister or his deputies. The provinces get their budgets dolled out to them by the Finance Ministry, etc. The attempt by Basra to form its own region flopped and only got around 1% of the province's approval. I just don't see decentralization happening in Iraq.
Gregg, I was at the conference and that panel discussion, and I agree -- economic development was almost entirely ignored. Allawi, the only one to tackle the question about Iraq in 2020, was thoroughly pessimistic.
One of my favorite moments of that panel: Francke decried the usage of sectarian terms and insisted their use keeps the dialogue defined by sectarianism (I can't remember the exact quote). She looked over at Corbin as she finished her point. Corbin smiled, nodded agreeably and scribbled a few notes.
Also, regarding the A&A brigades -- perhaps they might define PRT security as force protection and not combat operations?
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