Smiles, handshakes, and no progress

Making the settlement freeze a secret is solely a concession to Netanyahu. He would avoid the political consequences of curbing settlement growth, a move which is hugely unpopular with the right wing of his party (and a large swath of his governing coalition). Abbas, on the other hand, would be deprived of the political benefits of securing a freeze.

Abbas has an election coming up in January -- maybe -- and you can be sure Fatah wants to tout a settlement freeze as one of its accomplishments.

A secret freeze would also raise questions of accountability: How do you enforce an agreement that, in public at least, does not exist? Yedioth Ahronoth quotes one unnamed Palestinian making exactly that point.

"The Israelis do not honor commitments that the whole world knows and supports, such as those of the Road Map, so in this case an unclear and non-public commitment is out of the question," one source said.

Al-Quds Al-Arabi reports (عربي) that Clinton's proposal also includes the usual loopholes. It would exempt East Jerusalem, and it would also allow Israel to continue construction already underway (probably about 3,000 homes).

The paper quotes Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, who describes the settlement freeze as an "obligation" that Israel must meet before peace talks can resume. Clinton acknowledged the loopholes in the deal, according to Erekat, but she said it was the best the Israelis had offered so far and asked Abbas to resume negotiations.

Abbas, meanwhile, reportedly pressed Clinton on recent tensions in Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount riots and Israel's ongoing demolition of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem.

Helping the extremists

None of this is unexpected. Abbas and Netanyahu have both clearly staked out their positions: Abbas won't talk without a full settlement freeze, and Netanyahu is unwilling to give one. So I doubt anyone who closely follows the "peace process" had any high negotiations for today's meetings.

But Clinton's personal involvement ensures the meetings will receive a high level of media attention. That means the question of narrative is an important one: Will Abbas be portrayed as unwilling to accept a legitimate offer from the Israelis?

That seems to be the storyline so far, particularly in the Israeli media. The right-wing Jerusalem Post, for example, writes that Abbas "resisted U.S. pressure" to restart negotiations.

Ehud Barak, the Israeli defense minister, said today that Hamas benefits from delays in the peace process.

"A dead end in the diplomatic process will only serve Hamas and the other extremist elements in the region," said Barak in a statement.

Barak is right. If nothing else, the stalled peace talks make Fatah look weak and impotent; politics is a zero-sum game, so Fatah's loss is Hamas' gain.

The same dynamic also exists in Israel, though, and that's why the narrative is damaging for Abbas. Israel's right wing already believes that it has made enough unilateral concessions -- the Gaza withdrawal, for example -- without receiving anything in return. And it views Netanyahu's watered-down secret settlement freeze as another significant concession.

None of this is to say that Abbas should accept the offer, though. Accepting anything short of a full settlement freeze would be political suicide (for an already weak leader).

But it creates a nasty feedback loop: Abbas can't accept an Israeli proposal because of domestic opposition; his rejection, in turn, increases Israeli opposition to future proposals, making it less likely Abbas will ever receive one he can accept.