Iran agrees to draft IAEA deal

Iran has agreed to the draft of a deal with the IAEA, which firms up the agreement-in-principle from Oct. 1.

Under the agreement, Iran would send 75 percent of its low-enriched nuclear fuel -- about 2,600 pounds -- to Russia for further enrichment. It's supposed to use the more highly-enriched fuel for a medical reactor.

Mark Leon Goldberg over at UN Dispatch characterizes the deal as a good first step. That seems like an accurate read.

This is clearly not the sort of comprehensive deal between Iran and the P5+1 that could ultimately provide a lasting solution to the question of Iranian nuclear proliferation. Still, it certainly shows that deals can be struck, that diplomacy can work, and that saber rattling may not be the most effective method for securing Iranian cooperation on the nuclear issue.

There are some potential pitfalls with this draft, like the fact that Iran and the "P5+1" countries still need to approve it. IAEA director Mohamed ElBaradei wants a decision by Friday. David Sanger outlines some of the technical concerns in his NYT article:

If Iran actually sends a majority of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to Russia in a single shipment, it would have too little fuel on hand to build a nuclear weapon for roughly a year, according to the agency's experts. If the 2,600 pounds of fuel leave Iran in batches, the experts warn, Iran would be able to replace it almost as quickly as it leaves the country.

Also of concern is the possibility that Iran might have more nuclear fuel than it is letting on. The estimate that Iran has about 3,500 pounds of low-enriched uranium "assumes that Iran has accurately declared how much fuel it possesses, and does not have a secret supply," as one senior European diplomat put it on the sidelines of negotiations here.

On the first point, presumably the U.S. is aware that the timeline is a potential loophole, and won't accept a deal that allows Iran to export fuel in batches. On the second point, well, that's always a risk we're going to run when negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program.

This agreement doesn't actually solve anything. But by leaving Iran without enough uranium to enrich a nuclear weapon, it buys some time for more difficult negotiations -- possibly a year, as Sanger writes, or possibly as little as three months, according to Josh Pollack over at ArmsControlWonk.

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