Calamitous civilian consequences

Strategic concerns

Goldstone begins the section on strategy by noting that he was "unable to interview high-level members of the Israeli armed forces," because the Israeli government refused to cooperate with his work. (Perhaps that helps to explain why critics think Goldstone's discussion of strategy is biased?)

Israel has "extensive and intimate knowledge of the realities of Gaza," the report says, noting that the Israeli military controls the Strip's borders - land and sea - and uses unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor the area. That was true even during the war, when Israel had UAVs assigned to infantry regiments. This depth of information certainly aided Israel's planning before and during the war. The report also notes that Israel's military is "among the most advanced in the world," and that the Israeli Defense Forces provide soldiers and officers with extensive training in international law.

... the Mission considers it highly unlikely that actions were taken, at least in the aerial phase of the operation, that had not been the subject of planning and deliberation... [and] what occurred on the ground reflected guidance that had been provided to soldiers in training and briefing exercises. (p. 327)

The IDF has only admitted to one error during Operation Cast Lead: The bombing of the al-Daya house in Zeytoun, which killed 22 people. Military officials say they meant to strike the house next door, and blamed the mistake on "operational error." In defending its performance, the IDF claims that "over 80 percent of bombs and missiles" reached their intended targets. In other words, Goldstone writes, "what was struck was meant to be struck."

The report then shifts to tactics, focusing on the "Dahiya doctrine" developed during the Lebanon war in 2006, which calls for widespread destruction of infrastructure. (Dahiya is a neighborhood in Beirut to which this doctrine was applied). The Israeli government has officially described its goals in Gaza as "limited to what the IDF believed necessary to... reduce the ability of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza to carry out future attacks." But the report also cites several Israeli politicians, including then-deputy prime minister Eli Yishai, who described a more expansive operation aimed at "destroy[ing] Gaza."

It is in the context of comments such as these that the massive destruction of business, agricultural land, chicken farms and residential houses has to be understood... [and also] the tightening of the restrictions of access to goods and people into and out of Gaza, especially since Hamas took power. the mission does not accept that these restrictions can be characterized as primarily an attempt to limit the flow of materials to armed groups.

This section concludes by noting Israel's vague definition of "promoting 'terrorist activity'": Since Hamas was the legitimate winner of the 2005 elections in Gaza, he writes, "it is not far-fetched for the Mission to consider whether Israel regards very large sections of the Gazan civilian population as part of the 'supporting infrastructure.'" Goldstone finds this broad definition of the enemy to be "contrary to international law."

Calamitous civilian consequences

On p. 335, we shift gears and focus on Gaza's civilian population; the report begins by noting, understatedly, that "people in Gaza have not been living in what can be called a 'normal' situation for a long time."

This is a long section -- 25 pages -- so perhaps the most forcible way to present its contents is to distill it into a list. This is what happened to the civilian population in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead.

• The electricity shortfall in the Gaza Strip was 41 percent by December 2008, and cooking gas was also in short supply (p. 337);

• 98 percent of industries were temporarily shut down, with 16,000 workers laid off, from June 2007 to July 2008 (p. 338);

• The agricultural sector lost $30 million and more than 40,000 jobs during the blockade, and another $170 million in damages during the war (p. 338, 340);

• 700 private businesses were damaged during Operation Cast Lead, 61 percent in the industrial sector, with direct losses totaling $140 million (p. 339);

• Scarce food supplies drove up prices, with the average family spent two-thirds of its income on food (p. 342);

• 7.2 percent of children have stunted growth due to malnutrition; 66 percent of babies have anemia, as do 35 percent of pregnant women (p. 342);

• 187 greenhouses were destroyed or damaged (p. 343);

• Thousands of homes were destroyed (between 3,354 and 11,135, depending on your estimate), releasing large quantities of asbestos into the environment (p. 344);

• 50,896 people were displaced during the war and housed in 50 URNWA shelters (p. 344);

• 80 percent of the water supplied in Gaza did not meet WHO standards, and more than 70 million liters of sewage was dumped into the sea each day (p. 346);

• During the war, 500,000 Palestinians had no access to running water; the rest received it for a few hours each week (p. 346);

• 29 ambulances were damaged or destroyed, and 48 percent of Gaza's health facilities were hit by shelling (p. 348);

• Water-related diarrhea increased by 18 percent between January 19 and February 8, 2009, because of microbiological pollutants (p. 349);

• 20 percent of Palestinian children suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (p. 349);

• 88 percent of UNRWA schools and 82 percent of Gaza are forced to operate on a shift system because there are not enough construction materials to build new schools (p. 352);

• 280 schools were damaged during Operation Cast Lead, and 164 students and 12 teachers were reportedly killed, according to Gaza authorities (p. 352);

• Hospitals reported a 40 percent increase in miscarriages and a 50 percent increase in neonatal deaths shortly after the war (p. 355);

• 30 percent of hospital patients are expected to develop long-term disabilities because they couldn't find access to long-term care or rehabilitation (p. 357);

• 200 people had limbs amputated (p. 357);

• 57 UNRWA buildings were hit by shelling or airstrikes, and seven UNRWA staff members were killed (p. 359).

Legal analysis

Let me pause for a moment. You can chronicle a list of horrors after any conflict; as Sherman said, "war is hell." But two things stand out about this list. First, it is exacerbated by Israel's years-long -- and still-ongoing -- blockade of the Gaza Strip. The damage to UNRWA schools, for example, wouldn't be so serious if UNRWA had concrete with which to rebuild its schools -- but it doesn't, because of the blockade.

The second point is that you need to view this list in light of the strategy outlined above. Goldstone's argument -- well-supported by evidence, it seems -- is that Israel's widespread destruction of Palestinian infrastructure was not "collateral damage." It was intentional.

That's what Goldstone writes in the final pages of this section. He reminds readers of an occupying power's responsibility to maintain the infrastructure of the occupied territory, and condemns Israel for a policy of "collective punishment" that shuns said responsibility.

No consideration was given to the situation that prevailed in the Gaza Strip before the military operations... the Government of Israel seems to see the hardship and suffering of Palestinians as an inevitable consequence of a situation of war... this does not relieve Israel of its obligations under international humanitarian law. (p. 365)

The report walks through each of the circumstances described above -- the food shortages, the lack of housing, the destruction of medical services -- and concludes that each one represents a violation of the rights of the population of Gaza under the Geneva Conventions.