Chicken carnage and sewage spills

The IDF called the mill on the morning of December 30, 2008, and told workers to evacuate because of an imminent attack. That attack never happened; the employees returned to work, and one of the Hamada brothers called a business partner in Israel. The partner, in turn, reportedly called the IDF and asked them not to attack the mill. Another false warning call came on January 4, 2009.

The mill was attacked early on the morning of Jan. 9: An F-16 fired a missile, destroying machinery, and then an Apache helicopter fired several more missiles.

The strikes entirely disabled the factory and it has not been back in operation since. A large amount of grain remains at the site but cannot be processed. (p. 255)

Goldstone finds that the attack "greatly diminished" Gaza's ability to produce flour, leaving it dependent on external aid. The report segues into a discussion of international law, which bans belligerent parties from denying a population the right to produce its own food.

The report acknowledges that the IDF might have wanted to control the mill for military reasons - but argues that it could have accomplished that goal without firing a shot.

The building was one of the tallest in that area and would have offered extensive views to the Israeli armed forces. The Mission notes that taking control of the building might be deemed a legitimate objective in the circumstances. However, by 9 January the Israeli armed forces were fully aware that the flour mill could be evacuated at short notice using the warning message system. (p. 258)

The destruction of the mill is deemed a violation of international law.

Eggs, sewage and water

The report comes to a similar conclusion about several other attacks on infrastructure. There was the destruction of the Sawafeary chicken farm, for example, which killed more than 100,000 chickens - more than one-third of Gaza's egg-producing capabilities.

[Mr. Sawafeary] watched as the armored bulldozers destroyed the chicken farms, crushing the wire mesh coops with the chickens inside.... he noted that the drivers of the tanks would spend hours flattening the chicken coops, sometimes stopping for coffee breaks, before resuming their work.

[...] the Mission visited the site and saw the still flattened mesh coops, which had been covered with corrugated iron, as well as the remains of water tanks and machinery. (p. 262)

Here, the mission finds, there wasn't even a military objective; the farm offered no strategic advantage for to the IDF, and the area nearby was sparsely populated. Goldstone deems the destruction of the farm "wanton and not militarily necessary."

The IDF also bombed the Gaza wastewater treatment plant. Workers had evacuated the plant in the days leading up to the attack, so nobody is sure exactly when it was bombed, or with what. But the attack destroyed a sewage lagoon, sending more than 200,000 cubic meters of raw sewage flowing onto more than 5.5 hectares of farmland.

Again, as with the flour mill, the IDF notes that controlling the sewage plant offered a military advantage to the IDF. But it finds "no justification" for blowing up the lagoon.

The fact that the lagoon wall was struck precisely there where it would cause outflow of the raw sewage suggests that the strike was deliberate and premeditated. (p. 267)

Finally, the report considers an attack on the Namar wells near Jabaliyah refugee camp. The wells provided water to about 25,000 people in the camp. They were destroyed by "multiple air strikes" on the first day of Operation Cast Lead; repairs would cost more than US$200,000 and take more than ten weeks.

The destruction of housing

On p. 269, the report shifts to Israel's destruction of Palestinian homes. It divides those incidents into three categories. Some homes were destroyed because of military operations against Palestinian combatants; others, because the houses were "in the general path" of advancing troops; and still others for no apparent reason at all. It is the third group that the report focuses on.

The report is particularly critical of Israel's deliberate policy of destroying homes during the final days of the war, which the report describes as an effort to demolish Gaza's infrastructure before withdrawing. Goldstone notes that 65 percent of buildings destroyed in Rafah were destroyed in the final week of combat. Similarly, in al-Samouni, roughly half of the homes destroyed were attacked between Jan. 16 and Jan. 19. In al-Atatra, that figure was close to 60 percent.

The report describes one such attack against a cement factory in eastern Gaza.

The factory owner, Mr. Abu Jubbah, had hidden in the house for two days with seven members of his family. Suddenly, a direct strike on the side of the house warned them that the house was to be destroyed and they should leave. Waving a white flag, Mr. Abu Jubbah left the house in a rush, put his family in a car and drove off. On their way they saw tanks and soldiers in the area. Their house was destroyed by shelling. It took several strikes to destroy it, while the factory facilities and the fence were demolished by bulldozers. Housing for 55 factory workers was also demolished with bulldozers. (p. 271)

Goldstone declares many of these attacks "violated the right to adequate housing" of the families living there - a violation of international law.

Catastrophic damage

In general, the report notes, Israel caused catastrophic damage to Gaza's infrastructure. 324 factories were destroyed, depriving about 40,000 people of their jobs. The destruction of food facilities, like the flour mill and the chicken farm, cost the impoverished Gaza Strip $37 million.19 of Gaza's 27 concrete factories - 85 percent of its production capacity - were destroyed. 30 hectares of greenhouses were demolished; thousands of water storage tanks were destroyed.

The facts ascertained by the Mission indicate that there was a deliberate and systematic policy on the part of the Israeli armed forces to target industrial sites and water installations.

[...] Israel displayed a premeditated determination to achieve the objective of destruction. It is, therefore, responsible for the intentionally wrongful acts it perpetrated... (p. 280)

The mission asked the Israeli government to respond to several allegations, but it received no response.