The 2009 AHDR, Part One: Defining 'Human Security'

The 2009 AHDR is all about "human security" in the Arab world. What is human security, you ask? A fair question. The United Nations - which sponsored the AHDR - defines human security as "the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable."

Human security is not exactly flourishing in the Arab world, writes UN Assistant Secretary-General Amat Al-Alim Alsoswa: "While there has been some improvement in quality of life in some countries, there are still too many people in the Arab region living insecure lives, too many people living under persistent pressures that inhibit them from realizing their potential as human beings, and too many traumatic events cutting lives short" (p. v).

The authors of the 2009 AHDR (and there were many) chose to focus their report on human security to draw attention to the plight of common people. In this sense, they hope to "rebalance" the world's "preoccupation" with the war on terror and to counter what they see as the prevailing tendency to fret over threats to the security of states, rather than citizenry.

In the post-Cold War world, threats have become legion: environmental pollution, international terrorism, large population movements, fragile and interconnected global financial systems, cross-border pandemics, the drug trade, human and arms trafficking, civil wars, sectarian and ethnic conflicts, and state repression. While a traditional concept of security would focus on threats to the state, such as classically defined wars and nuclear proliferation, states arguably have more to fear these days from such transnational and amorphous threats; thus, the focus on protecting human security (p. 18-19).

The report breaks human security down into seven categories:

1. Economic security threatened by poverty.
2. Food security threatened by hunger and famine.
3. Health security threatened by injury and disease.
4. Environmental security threatened by pollution, degradation and resource depletion.
5. Personal security threatened by crime and violence.
6. Political security threatened by repression.
7. Community security threatened by social, ethnic and sectarian conflict.

The AHDR visualizes human security as a necessary precursor lying beneath "human development" on a graph of human success, much like psychologist Abraham Maslow's "hierarchy of needs." In order to realize higher aspirations, people must first satisfy baser requirements - a steady supply of food, the assurance of protection from wanton violence, etc. Human security is defending against threats; human development is achieving aspirations (p. 20).

Of course, that makes the AHDR's decision to focus on human security all the more alarming. Are things really so bad in the Arab world that in 2009 we're still trying to satisfy needs that rank at the bottom of Maslow's hierarchy? As we progress through the report, I suppose we'll find out.

At this point in Chapter One, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed El-Baradei interrupts with a soliloquy, quoting a writer from the Financial Times: "The world has rarely been more peaceful or felt so insecure."

El-Baradei identifies four drivers of insecurity: the abject poverty of 40 percent of the world's population, the lack of good governance, the sense of a wealth and power imbalance between the Northern and Southern hemispheres, and the "artificial polarization along religious or ethnic lines." Solving these problems is important for countries even if they're separated by thousands of miles from troubled regions, he says: "If a new extremist group emerges in the Middle East, it makes me worry ... Not only because we are all members of the same human family - but also because of the probability that ... these developments will affect me sooner or later" (p. 21).

But few Arabic studies address human security, and Arab writers disagree over the scope of the concept. Aziz Al-Azmeh, a Syrian professor of Arab and Islamic studies at Budapest's Central European University, illustrates the competing intellectual currents. "Notions such as human security are undoubtedly a result of globalization," he writes. "However, if we take this trend to its logical conclusion without any consideration for the overall national interest or even for the pan-Arab interest, we will find ourselves careening headlong into an unforeseen abyss." The Arab state has the duty of constructing a broad concept of citizenship out of competing claims of "provincialism, sectarianism, clan-ism or tribalism," so it would be best not to condemn the ruling regimes entirely, Al-Azmeh seems to be saying (p. 22).

Most Arab writers don't believe that the achievement of human security rules out state security, rather they believe that if human security becomes pervasive in society, that will transform an authoritarian state "into one that respects the rule of law." Along the way, state security forces may have to reform or be replaced entirely, the report says. In a highly understated acknowledgment, the report also admits an positive role for state security: defending the country. "If a state should fall under foreign occupation and lose its autonomy or territorial integrity, this will have a negative impact on individual human security," it says.

With human security at least somewhat defined, Chapter One nears a close by asking whether the concept can be adequately measured. The AHDR attempted to do so by conducting opinion polls in four countries: Kuwait, where affluence is high, Morocco, "considered to have gone farther than any other Arab state along the path of political emancipation," Lebanon, where there is widespread political participation but also sectarianism and occasional civil war, and Palestine, or as the writers refer to it, the "Occupied Palestinian Territories," which are "languishing" under Israeli occupation (p. 26).

One section of the poll asked interviewees to consider 21 possible threats and answer whether they thought each was really a threat to them. In Kuwait, most people agreed on "environmental pollutants," followed by "water shortages." Lebanese put "assaults on persons and private property" and "hunger" at numbers one and two, yet curiously ranked "weak solidarity among members of society" the lowest. Most Moroccans said they felt threatened by "poverty" and "unemployment," while, predictably, Palestinians were most threatened by "occupation and foreign influence," followed by unemployment and poverty. For an unexplained reason, the report was unable to gather data on the perception of numerous threats in Kuwait and Morocco.

Presented with questions concerning their satisfaction with their current situation and their level of personal safety, Kuwaitis and Moroccans said they were the most pleased and safe, followed by Lebanon, with Palestinians coming in last (p. 27).

While the country questionnaires were administered to 1,000 people in each location on a random basis, the AHDR writers also organized three discussion groups specifically to speak with Arabs between the ages of 18 and 25 who all "had track records as civil society activists" (p. 28). It was wise to seek out the views of Arab youth, considering how young the Arab population is, but by selecting those with "track records" of activism, it seems to me that the AHDR self-censored the opinions of poor, rural, or perhaps even highly religious Arab youth who might not be members of student government or political advocacy groups.

The youth reached differing opinions. Some said that human security in Arab countries "should mean being able to choose between different options and having the opportunity to contribute to society, without being subjected to social or political pressures." Others thought that human security depended on the state guaranteeing rights, education, employment and political participation (p. 29).

Chapter One concludes by acknowledging that the idea of human security can be and has been abused - it has been used as a "license" for foreign intervention in Iraq and Somalia, the report says. But the concept can be a force for good, and the report aims to examine the roots of threats to human security and "suggest strategies for coping with them." The authors are also careful not to alienate Arab leaders who might be reading: "Moreover, there is not predisposition in its analysis either against or for Arab governments; rather, this report addresses itself openly to both governments and enlightened Arab public opinion."