August 31, 2009, 13:48

Blaming Bashar

The National's Phil Sands had a good item recently about the presence of Iraqi Ba'ath party members in Syria.

Just last month, 30 or so members of the Supreme Leadership for Jihad and Liberation, a network of more than half a dozen insurgent organisations, including the Iraqi Baath Party, held a summit meeting [in Damascus]. Over kebabs and spit-roasted chicken after the conference they discussed how to push the US military out of Iraq and how to topple the government.

I've been trying to figure out why Iraqi-Syrian relations collapsed so quickly, and I think the key to understanding that dynamic lies in Iraqi electoral politics.

The Syrian government certainly knows that "rejectionists" -- Ba'athists and others -- have made a home in Damascus. It might not be actively encouraging them, but it has certainly turned a blind eye to their presence.

(The Ba'athists, by the way, say they had no part in the ministry bombings earlier this month; a man arrested by the Iraqi police claims otherwise.)

The problem is that Nouri al-Maliki also knows this. He's not a naif. He was certainly aware, when he flew to Damascus earlier this month, that the Assad regime was at least tacitly harboring Ba'athists and other foes of the Iraqi government. But he chose to meet with Assad anyway, to talk about economic issues, to form a "cooperation council." Security was just one item on the diplomatic agenda.

The next day, though, the Baghdad ministry bombings reminded Maliki that security is still the #1 concern on the domestic agenda.

And that explains the caustic reaction towards Syria. After months of praising the improved security situation in Iraq, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi cities, Maliki seems to have belatedly acknowledged that security is deteriorating. He knows that improved security -- at least the perception of improved security -- is critical to his success in the 2010 elections.

By lashing out at Syria, Maliki is trying to blame Iraq's security problems on external forces. He's trying to distract attention from the incompetence and corruption within the Iraqi security forces (remember, the ministry bombings were facilitated by a $10,000 bribe paid to the police).

Nothing good will come of this diplomatic row, though; it certainly isn't good for needed reconciliation between the Iraqi government and Ba'athists. As Sands notes, there are reasons to doubt Ba'athist involvement in the bombings; and, regardless, the Syrian government is unlikely to hand over Ba'athist leaders. And Maliki's rush to judge the Sunni Ba'athists -- and to condemn Syria, a predominantly Sunni state -- will only reinforce their antipathy towards his Shi'ite government.

Nor is it likely to help his electoral chances next year -- already in question after last week's announcement of a Sadrist/ISCI coalition. Maliki might win some short-term political points by attacking Syria. But if he can't deliver a meaningful improvement in security by January, he's likely to be out of a job.