Forcing Maliki out of his job

Well, well. Interesting news out of Iraq this morning, where the Washington Post reports that prime minister Nouri al-Maliki will not be part of a proposed coalition government of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Moqtada al-Sadr's political party. But how significant is this?

Let's begin with a caveat: This ISCI-Sadr alliance hasn't actually happened yet. It could very well fall through; the two parties have clashed in the past, for example in Najaf, where Sadr's group has tried to build its influence and undermine ISCI. Or the alliance could hold and Maliki's Dawa party could join it. Such was the rumor last month, when Sadr said he was considering an alliance with both parties.

That said, if this report is true, it suggests two things about Maliki: The other two Shi'ite parties view him as a liability, and he's still confident about his own position.

The latter claim first: Maliki thinks he's in a strong position because, during his tenure, American troops left Iraqi cities and violence dropped precipitously. He has spent months linking himself to those trends -- billing June 30 as the day of glory, etc. -- and he thinks that Iraqi support for the U.S. withdrawal (or, more accurately, resentment for the occupation) will propel his Dawa party to success in January.

Maliki is reportedly refusing to join the Sadr/ISCI alliance because the other parties won't promise him the prime minister's job if the coalition wins a majority. So he's gambling on, essentially, an all-or-nothing strategy: Either he builds an alternative coalition and wins a sizable bloc, or he winds up a marginalized member of a minority party.

But the other Shi'ite parties obviously don't see him that way. In part that's because of worrisome recent trends: Violence is flaring around the country, particularly in Baghdad, northern Iraq, and Anbar province. They're also reluctant to promise him the prime minister's spot -- denying that post to members of their own parties.

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