A New Afghan Strategy

McChrystal: Afghan army too small

The U.S. still needs to double the size of the Afghan army, which will require billions of dollars and thousands of additional American troops:

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the newly arrived top commander in Afghanistan, has concluded that Afghan security forces will have to expand far beyond currently planned levels if President Obama's strategy for winning the war there is to succeed, according to senior military officials.

[...] Without significant increases, said another U.S. official involved in training Afghan forces, "we will lose the war."

Regular readers might have noticed that I'm a bit skeptical of the U.S. "strategy" in Afghanistan. Can you blame me?

Last week James Jones -- Obama's national security adviser -- made the questionable argument that economic and political development are possible at Afghanistan's current level of (in)security.

Now Gen. McChrystal says the Afghan army, even if it reaches its goal of 134,000 troops by 2011, will only be half the size it needs to be. What's the point of sending thousands of troops to fight and die in Helmand province if the Afghan army won't eventually be strong enough to take over?

And doesn't that totally undermine the "Jones Doctrine" of focusing on economic and political development? Jones seems to assume that the Afghan army will be able to secure the country in a few years. But McChrystal just admitted that the current strategy will never secure Afghanistan.

And for all this talk of "winning" or "losing" the war, I still have not seen a clear set of benchmarks that define success or failure. The Obama administration has laid out some vague goals -- but nothing you can measure.

No Comments

Post a Comment

Bombs and loopholes

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new American commander in Afghanistan, says the U.S. will cut back on airstrikes in Afghanistan. But will the cutback really happen?

McChrystal and false expectations

Things are already getting better in Afghanistan, according to Gen. Stanley McChrystal. But that's not really a defensible proposition, and also not one that helps a counterinsurgency strategy in the long term, because it cements in the public mind the illusion of quick and easy progress.

B'Tselem: Settlements occupy 42 percent of West Bank

Ben-Eliezer makes "secret trip" to Turkey: Israeli TV

CENTCOM talking sense on Hamas and Hizballah

Al-Akhbar: Our weekly brief

Peace Processing

Talking about direct talks: Netanyahu returns to the White House

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivering a statement in Jerusalem on July 1, 2010. (Photo: AFP)
US president Barack Obama will use a White House meeting with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to push for an extended West Bank settlement freeze. If Netanyahu doesn't offer one - and the domestic politics are quite difficult for him - it's hard to see any possibility of direct talks with the Palestinian Authority later this year.

The Afghan Surge

Obama's southern strategy

Gen. David Petraeus testifying on Capitol Hill. (Photo: Reuters)
The president's decision to nominate Gen. David Petraeus as the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan won't mean a major change in strategy. But there are mounting reasons for pessimism about current policy, particularly the relentless focus on southern Afghanistan. The deployment of tens of thousands of additional troops to Kandahar and Helmand serves few NATO objectives.

Freedom Flotilla Killings

Anticlimax: How much did the flotilla raid really change regional politics?

A demonstration in London against the Israeli attack on the Gaza-bound flotilla. (Photo: AFP)
It has accelerated Israel's isolation from several of its neighbors and allies; it has sharpened divisions within Turkish domestic politics; it has deepened perceptions that the Obama administration as too close to Israel. And it seems to have had a remarkably minor impact on Palestinian domestic politics.