The Arabist points to this bizarre blog pushing Omar Suleiman as the next president of Egypt. It makes an interesting jumping-off point for a discussion about Egypt's impending presidential transition. The blog is in Arabic, sorry -- I'll explain the important parts below.
A little background first. Omar Suleiman is Egypt's intelligence chief, a politically powerful figure whose name might be familiar if you follow regional news: he's a key mediator between Israel and Palestine. He met earlier this month with Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, in fact.
But he keeps a low profile within Egypt; I can't remember ever reading about a Suleiman speech or public appearance.
Now, the Web site. The banner reads No Gamal [Mubarak] and no Al-Ikhwan [Al-Muslimun, the Muslim Brotherhood]... we want... Omar Suleiman! It goes on to translate a number of articles about Suleiman's role in the Egyptian government and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
It's impossible to tell who created the site, of course, so we can't speculate about why they did it. Maybe it was a Suleiman supporter floating a trial balloon; maybe it was a false flag operation by a Gamal supporter. (Maybe it was a 13-year-old kid who likes Suleiman's sunglasses.)
Nonetheless, it's a good jumping-off point. Succession will be an increasingly big issue over the next two years: Hosni Mubarak's term ends in 2011, and it's unlikely that the 81-year-old president will run for a sixth term. Not to be morbid, but there's a good chance he would die in office, and the power structure in Egypt doesn't want the chaos that would follow. They'd rather transfer power peacefully in 2011.
We tend to view that succession as a binary choice: Gamal takes over for his father, or the Muslim Brotherhood sweeps into power. That's an oversimplification.
It's true that the Brotherhood has a large base of support in Egypt. Their social programs make them extremely popular, particularly in places like Assiut that have historically been neglected by the central government. But remember that the Brotherhood only controls about 20 percent of the Egyptian parliament -- a large number, yes, but hardly a majority.
Then there's Gamal. He's popular among Egypt's elites -- he's Westernized, pro-business, a former investment banker. He has also assumed a leadership role in the ruling National Democratic Party over the last seven years, and this makes him a front-runner for the presidency.
But he's unpopular among everyone else in Egypt for precisely the same reasons; he's viewed as out of touch with the concerns of average Egyptians, at least in the dozens of conversations I've had with people around the country. He lacks his father's populist touch.
Gamal also has the burden of being Hosni's son; the current president is deeply unpopular with most Egyptians.
There's one other obstacle to overcome: Gamal isn't not a military man. All of Egypt's post-revolutionary presidents -- Mubarak, Sadat, Nasser, Naguib -- have been military officers. Gamal is not. And there's no indication he has strong support from Egypt's generals, who likely view him as unready to lead the country -- and unwilling to defend their privileged role in society.
All of this raises the possibility of a dark horse like Suleiman making a move for the presidency. I don't know how popular Suleiman would be; he's essentially Hosni's right-hand man. But he would have military support -- he's a veteran and a well-respected intelligence chief. The NDP would also back him; he's well respected within the party.
This is all very hypothetical right now. But there is definitely going to be a changing of the guard in Egypt within the next few years -- and policymakers would be wise to look beyond the Gamal-vs.-the-Brotherhood dynamic.